

Message Text

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USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0294

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: BRITISH JUNE 18 PAPER ON OPTION III

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE DELEGATION'S MAIN RESERVATION ABOUT
THE VALUABLE UK PAPER ON OPTION 3 ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS
(TEXT IN STATE 144904) IS THAT THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
WHICH IT TAKES WOULD DEPRIVE THE WEST OF ITS BEST
ARGUMENT AGAINST ACROSS-THE-BOARD ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS

AND IN FACT OPENS THE DOOR TO PROBABLE STRONG EASTERN
PRESSURES IN THAT DIRECTION. END SUMMARY.

1. WE FIND THE UK PAPER ON CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS

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ISSUES ON MBFR THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. ALTHOUGH

DISAGREEING AS TO THE CORRECT CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO LIMITATIONS, THE UK SEEMS TO AGREE WITH US VIEW THAT THERE MUST BE A LIMIT ON WITHDRAWN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND ON SOVIET TANKS. THE UK TAKES A POSITION SIMILAR TO THE US POSITION ON LIMITATIONS ON WARHEADS AND MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND IT APPEARS TO BE CLOSE TO THE US POSITION WITH REGARD TO LIMITS OF US AIRCRAFT. THE PAPER TAKES A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE INEVITABILITY OF SOVIET PRESSURES FOR EXTENSION OF WITHDRAWN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TO THE OTHER ALLIES. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL IN PARAGRAPH 13 OF THE BRITISH PAPER IN THIS CONTEXT THAT A STUDY BE MADE OF THE AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT PROGRAM SCHEDULED FOR EACH MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE ALSO SUPPORT SERIOUS STUDY OF THE PROPOSAL IN PARAGRAPH 19A OF THE UK PAPER FOR UNEQUAL CEILINGS ON SOVIET OR AGGREGATE WARSAW PACT TANK HOLDINGS ON THE ONE HAND AND THE US OR ALLIED HOLDINGS ON THE OTHER HAND. UK WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE THIS POSSIBILITY IS IN OUR VIEW A FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE REALISM OF THEIR POSITION.

2. HOWEVER, WE HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE UK CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS. ALL AGREE WITH THE UK VIEW THAT THE ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS PROBLEM IS THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE IN THIS CONNECTION SHOULD BE TO RETAIN MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR THE WEST, COMBINED WITH MEANINGFUL ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH SIDES. THE REQUIREMENT FOR MEANINGFUL ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS IN TURN REQUIRES LIMITATIONS ON THOSE ARMAMENTS WITHDRAWN BY AGREEMENT. BUT THE REQUIREMENT FOR MAXIMUM NATO FLEXIBILITY CAN BEST BE MET IF NATO IS IN A POSITION TO ARGUE TO THE EAST THAT ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE ARMAMENTS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY AGREED. THIS APPROACH WOULD CREATE AN EFFECTIVE POSITION AGAINST PROBABLE STRONG EASTERN EFFORTS TO PUSH THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF ACROSS THE BOARD ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS.

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3. THESE EFFORTS WILL BE FORTHCOMING: A WELL-ATTESTED MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IS TO SEEK SOME DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND ESPECIALLY FRG MILITARY POTENTIAL. IT SHOULD NOT BE ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL IN PRACTICE TURN OUT TO BE UNWILLING TO APPLY THE RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS THEY HAVE PROPOSED TO THEIR OWN FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN RETURN FOR EXTENDING SIMILAR CONTROLS TO THE WEST

EUROPEANS. THE MAIN BODY OF SOVIET FORCES IS IN THE USSR, WHERE IT WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY SUCH LIMITATIONS AND THE SOVIETS CAN AFFORD TO SUBJECT THEIR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA TO BROAD CONTROLS IF THEY GAIN BROAD CONTROLS OVER THE WEST EUROPEANS IN RETURN. THIS IS THE OFFICIAL EASTERN POSITION CONTAINED IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT, AND IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE GAINS AND LOSSES THIS APPROACH COULD ENTAIL FOR THE EAST IF IT WERE PUT INTO PRACTISE WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BEFORE IT WAS INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.

4. IT IS TRUE THAT THE US HAS DEPARTED FROM THIS PRINCIPLE IN ONE RESPECT IN THE QUESTION OF LIMITING SOVIET NUCLEARS. BUT IT CAN FAIRLY BE ARGUED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE EXCEPTIONAL IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THIS DEPARTURE FROM IT TO THE WESTERN POSITION OF PRINCIPLE OF LIMITING ARMAMENTS CEILINGS TO ITEMS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY AGREED ON COULD BE HELD WITHIN BOUNDS. IT IS IMPORTANT IN ANY EVENT THAT THE WEST BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE THE BASIC POSITION DESCRIBED AS A MATTER OF GENERAL PRINCIPLE.

5. AS PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE UK PAPER INDICATES, THE UK OPPOSES BARGAINING FOR LIMITATIONS OF SOVIET TANKS AGAINST LIMITATIONS ON WITHDRAWN US NUCLEARS. THIS MAY BE A BYPRODUCT OF THE UK DESIRE TO TRADE OPTION 3 AGAINST THE COMMON CEILING AND TO TREAT THE TANK ARMY AS A FUNCTION OF THE COMMON CEILING. BUT IN ANY EVENT, THE UK WISHES TO DEAL IN WHAT IT REGARDS AS A MORE CONSISTANT WAY WITH THE LIMITATIONS ISSUE: EACH MAJOR TYPE OF WEAPON,

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TANKS AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, WOULD BE TAKEN IN TURN. THE US AND THE USSR WOULD NEGOTIATE ON THE LIMITATIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH AS REGARDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SEPARATELY ON THE LIMITATIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH AS REGARDS TANKS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE UK HAS SUBSTITUTED FOR THE CATEGORIES OF LIMITATIONS PROPOSED BY THE US, CATEGORIES OF ITS OWN ACCORDING TO WHICH ALL LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR ELEMANTS OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BE TREATED AS ONE SEPARATE CATEGORY AND ALL LIMITATIONS ON TANKS WOULD BE A SECOND SEPARATE CATEGORY.

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ACTION ACDA-10

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0294

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

6. IN OUR VIEW, THIS APPROACH HAS THE MAJOR DEFECT THAT EAST AND WEST WOULD NO LONGER BE DISCUSSING LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN BARGAINED FOR AND SPECIFICALLY AGREED. INSTEAD, THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSING WHAT KIND OF U LIMITATIONS WOULD BE PLACED ON THE SAME KIND OF ARMAMENTS ON BOTH SIDES. HENCE, THE WEST WOULD NO LONGER BE IN A POSITION TO ARGUE THE BASIC POSITION THAT ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS SHOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE CONFICMSFFINED TO ARMAMENTS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED. THE WEST WOULD HAVE NO RATIONALE, OTHER THAN ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO AGREE, TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST EASTERN PRESSURE THAT ALL MAJOR ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA ON BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE LIMITED.

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7. ARISING FROM THIS CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCE, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES WITH THE UK APPROACH:

A. IT WOULD REQUIRE THE WEST TO MENTION ITS DESIRE TO LIMIT SOVIET NUCLEARS AT THE OUTSET OF THE DISCUSSION ON ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS. IT SEEMS WISER TO US TO FOLLOW A "DEVELOPMENTAL" APPROACH, FIRST GAINING A GENERAL AGREEMENT ON LIMITATIONS CONCERNING US NUCLEARS AND SOVIET TANKS BECAUSE THEIR REDUCTION HAD BEEN BARGAINED FOR AN ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH THIS PRINCIPLE AS A GENERAL RULE, AND ONLY THEN RAISING THE ISSUE OF LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEARS. THIS SEQUENCE ALSO AVOIDS INFORMING THE SOVIETS EARLY IN THE GAME ABOUT THE NUCLEAR LIMITATION, AN ACTION WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DECREASING THE INITIAL NEGOTIATING IMPACT OF OPTION 3.

B. THE UK APPROACH MAKES IT INEVITABLE RATHER THAN PROBABLE THAT THE EAST WILL INSIST ON LIMITATIONS ON US TANKS. ON THE OTHER HAND, UNDER THE US APPROACH, IT IS NOT FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT THE EAST WOULD ACTUALLY RAISE, OR COULD SUCCESSFULLY PRESS, A DAMAND FOR LIMITATION ON US TANKS IN RETURN FOR LIMITAION ON SOVIET NUCLEARS. UNDER FAVORABLE CONDITIONS, THE WEST MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET THIS LIMITATION ON AN UNILATERAL BASIS. THIS POSSIBILITY IS A LIMITED ONE, BUT SHOULD BE EXPLORED. THE UK APPROACH GIVES AWAY THIS POSSIBILITY FROM THE OUTSET.

C. BECAUSE THE UK APPROACH DEALS WITH LIMITATIONS ON US TANKS AND SOVIET TANKS IN THE SAME CATEGORY, IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET CASE THAT LIMITATIONS OF US TANKS SHOULD BE IN TERMS OF THEIR PRESENT ACTUAL STRENGTH, IN RECIPROCITY FOR LIMITATION OF THE ACTUAL STRENGTH OF SOVIET TANKS FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS. THE UK APPROACH THEREFORE WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT RATHER THAN EASIER TO GAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE UK PROPOSAL OF ROOM AT THE TOP FOR US TANKS.

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D. THE UK APPROACH OF TREATING ALL TANK LIMITATIONS TOGETHER AS ONE ACROSS THE BOARD CATEGORY AND ALL NUCLEAR ELEMENT LIMITATIONS TOGETHER AS A SECOND SEPARATE CATEGORY RATHER THAN FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO DIFFERENT

ARMAMENTS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY
AGREED, WOULD BOLSTER THE LOGIC OF THE EASTERN
CASE. THE EAST WILL HAVE AN EASIER TIME ARGUING THAT,
IF THERE ARE GOING TO BE LIMITATIONS ON
THE TANKS AND UNCLEAR ELEMENTS OF THE US AND THE
SOVIET UNION, THESE LIMITATIONS MUST NECESSARILY BE EXTENDED TO

COVER THE SAME WEAPONS OF THE ALLIES OF EACH.

8. IN SUM, THE UK PAPER SEEMS A LESS EFFECTIVE
APPROACH THAN THE US APPROACH TO THE OBJECTIVE OF
ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE BARRIER AGAINST EASTERN
PRESSURES FOR COMPREHENSIVE ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS
WHICH WOULD LIMIT NATO FLEXIBILITY. RESOR

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